How a consumer-goods leader used 3 moves to turn a 50% accident reduction into culture change in 6 months
A PepsiCo South America case study shows how 3 leadership moves changed decision rights, field verification, and daily review, turning a 50% accident reduction in 6 months into a culture shift.

Key takeaways
- 01A 50% reduction in accident ratio matters only when leaders change the routines that created the risk in the first place.
- 02Decision rights, field verification, and daily review are the three levers that made the result durable.
- 03Training alone is too weak if the job still rewards speed over verification.
- 04A metric without field checks can flatter leaders while the same habits keep drifting underneath it.
- 05Andreza Araujo ties culture change to repeated decisions, not to slogans or campaign language.
During her tenure at PepsiCo South America, where the accident ratio fell 50% in six months, Andreza Araujo learned a lesson that many safety programs still miss. A fast result is not the same as a durable result. If leaders do not change the routines that create risk, the next pressure cycle will try to rebuild the old pattern.
A real safety turnaround survives only when leaders change three things at the same time: who can decide, what the daily review inspects, and how the field confirms that controls are still real.
That is the thesis of this case study. As Andreza Araujo argues in Safety Culture: From Theory to Practice, culture is visible in repeated decisions, not in slogans. In more than 250 cultural transformation projects across 30+ countries, the same pattern appears again and again: when leaders fix the operating rhythm, the field changes faster than the slide deck.
Initial scenario
The starting point was not indifference. It was an operation that still leaned on reaction. Leaders cared, supervisors tried hard, and the site could produce reports, but the management system still spent too much time explaining the last event and too little time shaping the next one.
Across 25+ years leading EHS at multinationals, Andreza Araujo has seen that many plants ask for more training when the actual problem sits in decision flow, supervision, and the way weak signals are handled. James Reason is useful here because he shows how latent failures line up quietly before they surface as harm. Patrick Hudson is useful too, because his maturity model explains how an organization can look structured while still depending on a few strong people to keep things from drifting.
If you want the evidence side of that problem, the article on safety culture traces shows the kinds of field signals that matter, while cosmetic compliance shows why a clean dashboard can still hide a weak operation.
Decision
The leadership decision was to stop treating accident reduction as a campaign and start treating it as a management design problem. That shift matters because campaigns are temporary, while routines are what people actually repeat when pressure rises.
The first move was to make decision rights explicit. Someone had to know when work could continue, when it had to stop, and when an exception had to move beyond the shift. The second move was to make field verification part of leadership work, not an extra chore for the safety team. The third move was to make supervisors own the follow-through on weak signals, so the organization did not confuse presence with control.
This is where visible felt leadership stops being a phrase and becomes a practice. Presence only matters when it changes what a supervisor asks, checks, and closes. If the manager walks the floor but leaves every decision untouched, the site has movement, not leadership.
Andreza Araujo often frames this point in Safety Culture Diagnosis: Learn how to do your own. A site does not become safer because leaders say they care. It becomes safer when the system makes the next decision easier than the old one.
Execution
The execution phase was practical and unglamorous. The site moved from broad messages to specific routines. Daily reviews stopped focusing only on status and started focusing on open controls, delays in escalation, and places where a supervisor was carrying work that should have been visible to the line. That change reduced the space where drift could hide.
One useful lesson from this case is that training did not lead the change. Training helped only after the work itself changed. That is a key trap the market minimizes. If the job still rewards speed over verification, no amount of classroom time will keep the field honest for long. The supervisor will still feel pressure to get through the shift, and the crew will still look for the shortest path around the slowest barrier.
As Andreza Araujo writes in A Ilusão da Conformidade, translated as The Illusion of Compliance, a clean document can hide a dirty process. The point is not to reject procedure. The point is to make the procedure match the work people actually do.
For that reason, the article on building a safety decision trail is a useful companion. If a leader cannot show what changed, who decided, and when the control was verified, the improvement story is too fragile.
Measured result
The headline result was a 50% reduction in accident ratio in six months. That number matters, but only because it was tied to a visible change in how the site made decisions. Leaders stopped waiting for the monthly report to tell them what the field already knew. Supervisors stopped carrying weak signals alone. The line no longer depended on a few heroic people to keep the barriers upright.
| Indicator | Before the shift | After the shift | Why it mattered |
|---|---|---|---|
| Accident ratio | Improved unevenly, then drifted back under pressure | 50% lower in six months | The result showed the system was changing, not just the report |
| Daily review | Status reporting and lagging numbers | Open controls, weak signals, and follow-through | Leaders saw drift early enough to act |
| Supervisor response | Firefighting and local workarounds | Clear escalation and verification | The crew no longer had to guess which exceptions mattered |
| Field evidence | Mostly narrative and after-the-fact | Visible checks in the work itself | The site could prove that control was real |
That pattern is why a site can improve fast without becoming superficial. The reduction is real, yet the deeper result is that people now expect managers to look at work, not only at reports. That expectation is culture change.
Generalizable lessons
Three lessons matter most.
- Culture changes when decision rights are explicit. If nobody knows when to stop work, the lowest-friction choice becomes the default.
- A metric without field verification is easy to flatter. The number may move while the same bad habits stay alive underneath it.
- Training alone is too weak when the job still rewards speed over control. The work has to change, because people adapt to the system they inherit.
- Managers should inspect the barrier, not the story. If the control is failing in the field, a nicer narrative will not fix it.
Those lessons fit James Reason's view of latent failure, and they fit Andreza Araujo's own view in Safety Culture: From Theory to Practice. Safety turns durable when leaders stop asking the field to compensate for vague authority, weak follow-up, and invisible drift.
If you want a practical counterpart to this lesson set, management review traps shows how leadership meetings become ceremony, while culture traces shows how to test whether the system really changed.
What to apply in your operation
If you want to use this case in a plant, warehouse, or multi-site operation, start with one routine that repeats every week and one risk that people already know but keep normalizing. Do not begin with a broad safety campaign. Begin with the one decision that controls whether the work continues, pauses, or escalates.
Then do four things. Name the decision owner. Put one field verification into the daily review. Write the open control, not just the action item. Close the week with a note about what changed in work, not only what was discussed in a meeting.
This is where the gap between a good metric and a good system becomes obvious. A manager can report progress and still leave the old habit untouched. A better manager makes the new habit easier to repeat, which is why the next shift does not have to rediscover the same risk.
For leaders who want to go deeper, the books and programs by Andreza Araujo give more than a slogan. They show how to read culture, diagnose drift, and turn a metric into a management decision.
FAQ
Why does a 50% reduction not automatically mean culture changed?
Because a metric can improve while the same habits remain in place. Culture changes only when leaders change decision rights, review routines, and field verification. Andreza Araujo treats the metric as evidence, not as the whole story.
What changed first in this case?
The first change was in the operating rhythm. Leaders made decisions more explicit, moved field verification into leadership work, and used daily reviews to surface weak signals before they turned into repeat risk.
How should a plant manager use this lesson?
Pick one recurring risk, define who can stop or re-sequence the work, and add one verification step to the daily review. If the manager cannot show what changed in the work, the improvement is still too fragile.
Why did training not lead the change?
Because training only works when the job itself is designed to support it. If the work rewards speed over verification, people will adapt to the pressure and look for shortcuts unless the operating system changes too.
Which Andreza Araujo book fits this topic first?
Safety Culture: From Theory to Practice is the best starting point because it explains why culture shows up in repeated decisions. Safety Culture Diagnosis: Learn how to do your own is the next step if you want to turn that idea into evidence.
The real test is simple. If the next pressure cycle arrives, does the site still depend on heroics, or does it have a routine that holds without noise? If you need help checking that difference, request a safety culture diagnostic or start with Safety Culture: From Theory to Practice and Safety Culture Diagnosis: Learn how to do your own.
Frequently asked questions
Why does a 50% reduction not automatically mean culture changed?
What changed first in this case?
How should a plant manager use this lesson?
Why did training not lead the change?
Which Andreza Araujo book fits this topic first?
About the author
Andreza Araújo
Safety Culture Expert | Senior EHS Executive
Andreza Araújo is a safety culture expert and senior EHS executive with more than 25 years of experience in environment, health and safety. She is a Civil Engineer and Occupational Safety Engineer from Unicamp, holds a Master's degree in Environmental Diplomacy from the University of Geneva, and completed sustainability studies at IMD Switzerland. Andreza has served in Global Head of EHS roles in Fortune 500 environments, leading cultural transformation programs across multinational operations. She has represented Brazil as a speaker at the United Nations in Paris and has spoken at the International Labour Organization in Turin. She is the author of more than 16 books on safety culture in Portuguese, Spanish, English and German. Her work has earned more than 10 EHS awards, including two recognitions from Indra Nooyi, former PepsiCo CEO.
- Civil & Safety Engineer (Unicamp)
- M.A. Environmental Diplomacy (University of Geneva)
- Sustainability Cert (IMD Switzerland)
- People Management & Coaching (Ohio University)
- UN Paris speaker representative for Brazil
- ILO Turin speaker
- LinkedIn Top Voice
- Indra Nooyi PepsiCo CEO recognition (2x)
Documentaries
Watch Andreza's documentaries
Three productions on safety culture, organizational failure and the human lessons behind major disasters.
Podcasts
Listen to Andreza's podcasts
She hosts three shows on safety leadership, EHS and organizational culture, in English and Portuguese.